Anti-Psychiatry And The Biomedical Model: From Delusion To Disorder by Curtis-Warner, Logan Caroline & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
 
ANTI-PSYCHIATRY AND THE BIOMEDICAL MODEL: 
FROM DELUSION TO DISORDER 
 
 
by 
 
Logan Caroline Curtis-Warner 
 
 
Honors Thesis 
 
Appalachian State University 
 
Submitted to the Department of Philosophy and Religion 
and The Honors College 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
 
Bachelor of Arts 
 
May, 2020 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
Matt Ruble, Ph.D., Thesis Director, 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
Kurt Michael, Ph.D., Second Reader 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
Laura Ammon, Ph.D., Departmental Honors Director 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
Jefford Vahlbusch, Ph.D., Dean, The Honors College 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Psychiatry as it functions today is largely guided by the biomedical model of mental 
illness, which rests upon the notion that deviations in mental functioning are biological in nature. 
This thesis seeks to critique this understanding of psychological distress through the lens of the 
philosophical tradition of anti-psychiatry, drawing primarily from the works of Thomas Szasz 
and Michel Foucault. Szasz places emphasis on the diagnostic disparities between physiological 
and psychological illness, arguing that the experiences and behaviors that psychiatrists class as 
mental diseases are actually communicative strategies utilized by individuals who lack the tools 
to properly address the stressors in their lives. In contrast, Foucault approaches the issue from a 
historico-political context, considering the power dynamics involved in the psychiatric encounter 
by giving an account of its evolution since the days of the asylum. Drawing from the description 
of the biomedical model given by investigative journalist Robert Whitaker, I will consider how 
the philosophies of Szasz and Foucault relate to the modern psychiatric climate. Ultimately, I 
will argue that it is Foucault’s perspective that best equips us to critique the biomedical model, as 
its origins are inevitably intertwined with economic and political power. 
 
Introduction 
My goal in writing this thesis is to provide an overview of two philosophies that have 
been greatly influential in the antipsychiatric movement, followed by an analysis of the tools 
they give us to understand the more modern psychiatric climate. I will begin by discussing the 
work of Thomas Szasz, followed by a review of Michel Foucault’s writings on the subject. It is 
my belief that, while both bodies of work are attributed to the general movement of 
antipsychiatry, they differ greatly both in their methods of analysis and conclusions. After 
considering the theoretical contrasts between these two veins of antipsychiatry, which focus 
primarily on the age of hysteria, I will aim to characterize the shift in the psychiatric climate that 
has occurred since their conception. At this point I will draw heavily from the work of Robert 
Whitaker, who concerns himself with the chain of events that led to the heavily bioessentialist 
 
approach that we observe throughout today’s psychiatry. I will put forth the argument that it is 
the theoretical foundation provided to us by Foucault, as opposed to Szasz, which most 
effectively allows us to consider the forces behind this chain of events, and to consider the harm 
that results from the biomedical model of mental illness. Finally, I would like to put forth my 
own suggestions regarding how we might incorporate antipsychiatric concerns into our 
immediate efforts to help those struggling with their mental health. It is my belief that careful 
attention must be paid to the way in which we attribute the origins of individual suffering, as it is 
most often preceded by both personal traumas and underlying systemic issues, neither of which 
can be spirited away with the right prescription. 
 
Szasz and the Myth of Mental Illness 
Thomas Szasz’s arguments against the legitimacy of psychiatry are the most well-known 
and subsequently most critiqued arguments to arise from the anti-psychiatry movement. His 
1961 book , ​The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of A Theory of Personal Conduct,​ is 1
dedicated to exposing what has been described as mental illness to be the mystification of 
problems in living, rather than genuine disease. Here I will give a summarized account of his 
philosophy with regards to the status of psychiatry and the manner in which the phenomenon of 
mental illness has manifested in response. 
Psychiatry is, in Szasz’s writing, based on a false equivalency between physiological 
medicine and psychological suffering. In physiological medicine, doctors are able to definitively 
declare whether or not a patient has a particular disease, and they are able to do this because it is 
1 The first version was published as an essay in American Psychologist in 1953. 
 
contingent upon the discovery of a particular physical property within the patient. Physiological 
illness is diagnosed in an empirical fashion, with the confirmation of the presence of “alterations 
in the physicochemical integrity of the body” that is consistent across all manifestations of a 
specific disease (12). Autopsy, for example, can serve as an accurate test for the presence of a 
particular lesion, as the results of such a test cannot be simulated and remain consistent in any 
case. Meanwhile, the symptoms of mental illness are not traceable to any such observable 
abnormality, says Szasz. The diagnosis of mental disease depends entirely on the physician’s 
judgements regarding the appropriateness of the patient’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. This 
results in a diagnostic process that deals exclusively with the perceived ​functioning​ of the patient 
rather than any uniform indicator in ​structure​, allowing psychiatrists to ​declare​ the presence of a 
disease rather than ​discovering​ it (12).  
The acceptance of certain deviations in function as medical matters opens the door to the 
reclassification of any given undesirable behavior as a pathological phenomenon. Once an 
individual has taken up the mantle of psychiatrist, whatever discomfort that is brought to them 
may be explained in the terms of illness. Szasz demonstrates this transformation of circumstance 
into symptom using the example of malingering. The conception of malingering as a disease has 
pathologized even the supposed lack of disease, resulting in a clinical scenario in which it is 
impossible to fail to meet the criteria for illness. Either one’s symptoms are genuine, in which 
case their interpretation will lead to the diagnosis of a particular mental illness, or one’s 
symptoms are being simulated for attention, in which case they may be diagnosed with 
malingering. It is possible to offer a psychoanalytic explanation for any given behavior presented 
to the psychiatrist, resulting in the pathologization of all behaviors.  
 
Szasz argues that psychoanalysis is ineffective as a science because its theoretical basis is 
unsound. While the sciences that inform physiological medicine, biology and chemistry, consist 
in causal laws, psychoanalysis relies on the doctrine of historical determinism on the level of the 
individual. The philosophy of taking personal history as equivalent with the determinism of 
physical laws leaves no room for autonomy, on Szasz’s view: 
“It is obvious...that not only psychoanalysis but also much of psychiatric theory assumes 
that personal conduct is determined by prior personal-historical events. All these theories 
down-grade and even negate explanations of human behavior in terms such as freedom, choice, 
and responsibility” (5). 
 
  His issue with the approach of psychoanalysis lies not necessarily in its attempts to 
change the behavior of those suffering, but rather the language it uses to interpret such suffering, 
which it uses to legitimize itself as a medical authority. To demonstrate the incongruity between 
the language used in psychotherapy and its actual mechanisms, Szasz picks apart descriptions of 
patients and their suffering as given by Sigmund Freud, objecting that he obscures the origin of 
their “symptoms” while simultaneously recognizing the situations that give rise to them. In an 
excerpt from one of his case studies, Freud is quoted inquiring about the origins of a hysteric’s 
suffering: 
“We may ask: What is it that turns into physical pain here? A cautious reply would be: 
Something that might have become, and should have become, mental pain.” 
 
In response, Szasz remarks: 
“Freud answers these questions by taking recourse to what Colby has aptly called a 
‘hydraulic metaphor.’ It seems evident, however, that no such complicated explanation is 
required. All that is necessary is to frame our questions differently. We might then ask: Why 
does a patient complain of pain? Why does the patient complain about his or her body when it is 
physically intact? Why does the patient not complain about personal troubles? If we ask the 
 
second set of questions, then the answers must be phrased in terms of the complainant’s 
personality and situation.” (76) 
 
The questions listed by Szasz above serve well to summarize some of the main tenets of 
his objections to psychiatry. He wishes to ask why the patient complains of pain and not personal 
troubles because he wishes to frame such behaviors not behind the veil of the subconscious but 
in terms of personal motivations and reinforcement. The “hydraulic metaphor” of psychosomatic 
conversion is not supported by any empirical evidence but merely by speculation guided by the 
principles of “personal-historical” determinism. The question regarding the physical intactness of 
the patient’s body emphasizes his initial distinction between those complaints that ought to be 
considered medical and those that ought to be considered personal: the presence of a lesion.  
For Szasz, any issue that may be falsely interpreted as mental illness by the psychiatrist 
boils down to issues in communication​.​ He objects to the medicalization of such conduct on the 
grounds that it legitimizes it, obscuring the patient’s agency regarding the circumstances at the 
root of their suffering. This process of legitimization begins, as Szasz tells it, with 
neuropathologist Jean-Martin Charcot’s work on the treatment of hysterics, most notably at the 
Salpêtrière. Charcot’s role in reclassifying hysteria as genuine illness rather than simulation is 
much like the invention of the guillotine in this regard, Szasz tells us:  
“To put it succinctly, Guillotin made it easier for the condemned to die, and Charcot 
made it easier for the sufferer, then commonly called a malingerer, to be sick. It may be argued 
that when dealing with the hopeless and the helpless, these are real accomplishments. Still, I 
would maintain that Guillotin’s and Charcot’s interventions were not acts of liberation, but were 
rather processes of narcotization or tranquilization” (24). 
 
The transformation of hysteria from a condition imitating organic neurological disease to 
a condition consisting in neurological dysfunction was achieved by virtue of  Charcot’s medical 
 
authority alone, contends Szasz, in spite of a woeful lack of empirical evidence indicating an 
organic basis for the hysteric’s symptoms. In considering the legacies of Charcot and Freud, it is 
further demonstrated that the constituent symptoms of mental illness are merely asserted to be 
pathological in nature, by extending the status of illness to those whose complaints could not be 
traced back to any discoverable bodily lesion. 
“The adjectives ‘mental,’ ‘emotional,’ and ‘neurotic’ are semantic strategies to codify -- 
and, at the same time, to conceal -- the differences between two classes of disabilities or 
‘problems’ in meeting life: one consists of bodily diseases which, by impairing the functioning 
of the human body as a machine, create difficulties in social adaptation; the other consists of 
difficulties in social adaptation not attributable to a malfunction machinery but, on the contrary, 
inherent in the purposes the machine was made to serve by those who ‘built’ it (parents, society) 
or by those who ‘use’ it (individuals) ” (37).  2
 
 Reading the passage in italics, it would seem that Szasz positions the causality of  the 
experiences presented to the psychiatrist as illness somewhere within the impression societal 
values and individual desires have on behavior. Reading on, we find that Szasz draws attention 
to two societal influences that serve to encourage the simulation of mental symptoms as a 
method of communication -- the games of childhood and religion. He insists that both of these 
institutions reward helplessness, citing the power dynamics of the family, and passages of the 
Bible that condemn success as unholy (169). Ultimately, Szasz reveals a sort of fundamental 
belief that seems to inform much of his disdain for the reinforcement of help-seeking behaviors 
when he tells us that “we must continue to scrutinize all therapeutic attitudes and arrangements 
attributed to benevolence...such arrangements serve to debase the patient and elevate the 
physician” (176). It seems that he places the utmost value on personal autonomy, expressing 
resentment for societal influences he perceives as glorifying help-seeking behaviors. 
2 Emphasis mine. 
 
The frame of reference that is most equipped to produce an accurate analysis of the 
behaviors psychiatry deems disordered is, as Szasz tells it, that which examines behavior as it 
functions in game-playing and rule-following. Indeed, interventions based on the principle of 
revealing these patterns to the suffering individual are the only interventions Szasz deems 
appropriate. Psychoanalysis has the potential to successfully utilize this, if it could only re-orient 
its theoretical perception of itself. This must be achieved by  
“...abolishing the categories of ill and healthy behavior, and the prerequisite of mental 
sickness for so-called psychotherapy. This implies candid recognition that we ‘treat’ people by 
psychoanalysis or psychotherapy not because they are sick but because they desire this type of 
assistance; second, because they have problems in living for which they seek mastery through 
understanding of the kinds of games which they, and those around them, have been in the habit 
of playing; and third, because, as psychotherapists, we want and are able to participate in their 
‘education,’ this being our professional role” (248).  
 
This is the only frame of reference that Szasz feels fully accounts for the extent of human 
autonomy in motivating the behaviors and experiences that the psychiatrist declares disordered. 
 
Responses to Szasz’s Anti-Psychiatry 
Early responses to the critiques of anti-psychiatry, particularly those directed at Thomas 
Szasz, tend to focus on establishing a definition of “disease” that will rightfully include mental 
illness within its bounds. R. E. Kendell and Christopher Boorse are two individuals who played 
important roles in this effort, and I shall recount their arguments here. While their objections to 
Szasz raise some important questions, I believe that they are ultimately unsuccessful for reasons 
that will be more attentively explored in Foucault’s work. 
 
Kendell, in his article “​The Concept of Disease and its Implications for Psychiatry,” puts 
forth a definition of disease based on biological function. He begins by ruling out definitions 
based on complaint, and based on the point at which medical intervention is necessary. Both of 
these criteria, he argues, allow arbitrary cases of illness to be declared based on the whims of 
either the patient or the clinician. More essential is his rejection of disease as the presence of a 
lesion, which Szasz leans on quite significantly in his own work. Although this definition is not 
as susceptible to social and political misuse, it ultimately fails to encompass some things 
rightfully considered disease, and wrongfully includes others. Kendell cites trigeminal neuralgia 
as an example of a disease whose biological origin is unknown, and notes that the physiological 
basis of many diseases have only recently been discovered, despite their historical status as 
illnesses. Additionally, there are physical “deformities” such as fused digits and albinism that 
cannot rightfully be called diseases despite the presence of physiological abnormalities. In 
addition, there are many physicochemical deviations from the norm that occur in degrees, 
making it difficult to declare at which point they become “lesions,” such as hypertension. 
Indeed, it is by considering the case of hypertension that Kendell comes to the biological 
function model of disease. Hypertension may be considered illness not necessarily because the 
patient complains of suffering, nor simply because it is identified as dangerous by the clinician, 
but because it ultimately leads to a higher mortality rate. Kendell proposes the increase of 
mortality and decrease in fertility as hindrances to objective biological functions of the human 
species,  giving us two criteria by which we can indisputably judge a condition to qualify as 
illness. The remainder of his argument, then, consists solely in providing evidence that specific 
types of mental illness do indeed increase mortality and decrease fertility, meaning that they may 
 
rightfully be classified as diseases alongside the physiological ailments traditionally considered 
the subject of medicine.  
Christopher Boorse employs a similar line of reasoning, honing in on the concept of 
mental functions as inherent in the biological reality of the human species. In “What a Theory of 
Mental Health Should Be,” he writes: 
“​What the healthy mind is like is an empirical question that can be answered correctly or 
incorrectly. We are no more free to define mental health as the constellation of qualities we most 
admire than we would be for physical health. Mental health must be a constellation of qualities 
displayed in the standard functional organization of members of our species. Only empirical 
inquiry can show whether normal human beings have an even temper, engage in socially 
considerate behavior, and advance the species.” (70) 
 
So in essence, these critiques are aimed at responding to Szasz’s charge that psychiatry 
holds no empirical weight, insisting that the study of the mind and its functioning can be based in 
the objective notion of species design. While Kendell strives to show that the consequences of 
mental illness may be gauged by the same criteria as physiological illnesses, namely, an 
interference with the species-wide goals of survival and reproduction, Boorse lays out the 
justification for declaring certain mental properties as pathological, namely, those properties that 
defy species-design. While both of these objections to anti-psychiatry raise necessary questions 
of nuance regarding the concept of disease where Szazs’s work does not, they inevitably collapse 
into self-contradiction, as can be observed simply in each piece of writing discussed. 
After citing statistical evidence of increased mortality and decreased fertility in 
schizophrenics and​ ​other sufferers of psychosis, Kendell concedes that such trends may very well 
be explained by the ​social​ consequences of the diagnoses in question, such as time spent in 
asylums and the disdain experienced by individuals who may be considered dangerous and 
 
unpredictable. He goes on to suggest that social consequences such as these may, in a sense, 
themselves be considered biological consequences, considering that man is a social animal. In 
fact, some traits that may lead to an objective biological disadvantage may prove advantageous 
in particular social contexts: Kendell suggests the example of homosexuality and its resulting 
decrease in fertility, frowned upon by evolutionary standards but useful in communities that 
require additional resources to care for existing children. Nevertheless, he urges us to “ignore the 
increasing importance of cultural factors in who determines who lives and who dies,” lest we end 
up with the purely subjective concept of mental health that Szasz seeks to condemn (313). To 
conclude his argument, Kendell even goes so far as to wonder whether the needless 
psychiatrization of mere unhappiness (as opposed to those specific disorders that create a 
“biological disadvantage”) is what has prompted the anti-psychiatry movement in the first place, 
coming full-circle into Szasz’s fundamental objections towards the field.  
There have been multiple criticisms of the naturalist approach to dysfunction which have, 
in my opinion, rendered it outdated. KWM Fulford, in ​his piece “‘What is (mental) disease?': an 
open letter to Christopher Boorse,”​ discusses how values fundamentally cannot be extracted 
from the concept of mental illness. While physical disease may be described in objective 
terminology vis a vis departures from the norm, the same methodology cannot be carried over to 
mental disease, as it would first require a general consensus regarding which departures from the 
norm are positive and which are negative. Fulford also broaches the issue of the biological 
teleology inherent in naturalistic conceptions of illness such as Boorse’s and Kendell’s, 
reminding us that the concept of a “goal,” which cannot be avoided when speaking of “species 
design,” contains within it a positive evaluation. In a similar line of criticism, Derek Bolton 
 
reminds us that evolutionary function cannot possibly be separated from social function, 
considering that cooperative behaviors account for a large portion of the traits that have allowed 
humans to survive and prosper over the genesis of our species. He goes on to note that the study 
of epigenetics has reinforced the notion that our environments are determinant of the ways in 
which our genetics are expressed, meaning that even on a fundamentally biological level it is 
impossible to separate “innate” function from that which is learned. Furthermore, any study of 
mental functions will inevitably have to be conducted by considering their manifestations not in 
abstract hypotheticals but in observable life – meaning that they will be tied up in the person’s 
desires, experiences, and beliefs.  
Though such counterarguments against the attempt to conceive of a “values-out” 
psychiatry are relatively successful in beating back the concerns of Kendell and Boorse, I do not 
believe that they vindicate Szasz’s convictions either. He contends that psychiatry is a field of 
study devoted to misinterpreting the communications of those who are struggling to claim 
agency in their lived conflicts. The most pressing issues with Szasz’s philosophy, in my opinion, 
lie not in his arguments against the empirical status of psychiatric symptoms but in his 
explanation of what they “really are,” in which he heavily emphasizes the fickle-mindedness of 
the hysterics who simulate bodily symptoms as a strategy for sympathy. I think that the role of 
the societal values he sees as responsible for encouraging this behavior, religion and the 
dynamics of the family, are misinterpreted in his account. Ultimately, I feel that his 
libertarianesque prizing of human autonomy prevents him from understanding the larger 
structures at play in the clinical encounter, which is why I will be turning to Foucault for a more 
nuanced political analysis. 
 
 
Foucault and Psychiatric Power 
Though French philosopher Michel Foucault’s writings regarding psychiatry are typically 
listed adjacent to Szasz’s as part of the anti-psychiatry tradition, his analysis differs a great deal 
from the one just examined. While Szasz places emphasis on the ways in which psychiatry fails 
to properly follow the methods constitutive of proper medicine, instead identifying its major 
feature as the misidentification of problems in living as pathological, Foucault grounds his 
critique of psychiatry in historical and political developments. In order to gain a meaningful 
understanding of this critique, I would like to first give a brief explanation of Foucault’s account 
of the shift from sovereign power to disciplinary power.  
Initially developed in his ​Discipline and Punish​ and later referenced in his series of 
lectures entitled ​Psychiatric Power​, Foucault’s study of the metamorphosis of political power 
places focus on changes in the mechanisms used to control the members of a society. Sovereign 
power refers to the instruments of control employed by monarchs, which served as the main form 
of government until the x century. This form of control was defined by public displays of might, 
the purpose of which was to reinforce the public’s fear of the monarch’s God-given power. 
Punishment was not designed to correspond to a particular individual’s actions but to send the 
message that disrespect in the face of divine power would not be tolerated.  
Disciplinary power first began to develop in the military, spreading to other contexts 
before eventually becoming the all-encompassing mode of operation of society. Its defining 
feature is its omnipresence -- the structure it imposes on every aspect of life. Contrasting its 
features with the divine right of sovereign power, Foucault writes:  
“One is not then marked by an action made once and for all, or by a situation given from 
the start, but visible and always in the situation of being under constant observation. More 
precisely, we can say that there is no reference to an act, an event, or an original right in the 
 
relationship of disciplinary power. Disciplinary power refers instead to a final or optimum state. 
It looks forward to the future, towards the moment when it will keep going by itself and only a 
virtual supervision will be required, when discipline, consequently, will have become habit.” 
 
This last part of Foucalt’s explanation -- the reference to virtual supervision and habit -- 
is especially important to understanding the design and impact of disciplinary power. Foucault 
makes use of Bentham’s invention of the Panopticon in explaining the mechanisms of 
disciplinary power. The Panopticon is a system of surveillance that Bentham suggested could be 
of use in schools, prisons, workplaces, etc, which involves a circular tower in the center of the 
space that allows for the observation of all surrounding activity. Individuals would be arranged 
around the tower in separate units so that everyone can be accounted for at all times. Though the 
structure gifts the individual within an exhaustive view of the institution, it will be opaque from 
the outside, meaning that those being surveilled have no way of telling whether or not they are 
being observed in the present moment. This creates the possibility that one may be watched at 
any given time, forcing the individual to permanently behave as is expected.  
As the base principle of the Panopticon -- constant anonymous surveillance -- has been 
integrated into more and more dimensions of life, we have become our own keepers. The threat 
of grand punishment is no longer necessary to curb unwanted behavior. With this ultimate goal 
of discipline in mind, we can start to understand the context of the history provided in 
Psychiatric Power. 
At its core, Foucault describes psychiatric intervention not as a medical procedure but as 
a display of power. In order to demonstrate this, he begins with a history of the mechanisms of 
the asylum, investigating the manner in which they are meant to have a therapeutic effect. In 
agreement with Szasz, Foucault contends that the psychiatric approach to madness bears nothing 
 
in common with medicine methodologically, and merely adopts the mantle of medical authority 
in order to grant its actions legitimacy. In the asylum, there are no efforts made to identify 
differential diagnoses, and the treatment given to a particular patient is not determined by the 
supposed cause of their disease but by the problems their behavior presents to the doctor. It is not 
any medicinal practice administered by the asylum but the structure of the asylum itself which 
seeks to cure madness, as it is designed to stage the confrontations of will required to reform the 
sick individual to society’s standards.  
Madness during this period of time, explains Foucault, was essentially the presence of a 
will that refused to bow to others. He explains:  
“If you look at how a delirium, an illusion, or a hallucination was analyzed in this period, 
you see that it doesn't much matter whether someone believes himself to be a king, that is to say, 
whether the content of his delirium is supposing that he exercises royal power, or, to the 
contrary, believes himself to be ruined, persecuted, and rejected by the whole of humanity. For 
the psychiatrists of this period, the fact of imposing this belief, of asserting it against every proof 
to the contrary, even putting it forward against medical knowledge, wanting to impose it on the 
doctor and, ultimately, on the whole asylum, thus asserting it against every other form of 
certainty or knowledge, constitutes a way of believing that one is a king” (28). 
 
If madness consists of a belief that cannot be touched by the words of others, then the 
cure must consist not in words but in displays of power, events designed to demonstrate the 
victory of the doctor’s will over the will of the mad. Such interventions again do not involve the 
methodology of medicine but of discipline, administered in ways designed to reflect proper 
adjustment to the world beyond the asylum walls. Foucault gives a great deal of attention to the 
specific strategies used in the asylum, drawing from various historical accounts given by 
pioneers of “moral treatment” like Pinel and Leuret. 
 
The methods utilized by these figureheads of the asylum were designed specifically to 
structure the totality of the madman’s time, filling it with tasks that mirror the functionality of 
the outside world. Patients must demonstrate that they have internalized the values taught by 
these regimens, the values of work, currency, and exchange, through the admission of their 
madness in response to the doctor’s questioning. They will be punished repeatedly until they 
have internalized the doctor’s conception of their madness, until there is a moment in the 
interview where the truth is accepted by the patient and reproduced by him. We can see through 
these accounts of treatment that its goal is to reconfigure the recipient into someone who is 
capable of existing within the systems outside the asylum; the asylum exists to catch those who 
generate difficulties in the administration of disciplinary power and reform them in its image.  
Foucault’s conception of hysteria, much in contrast to that of Szasz, is developed as a 
direct result of the systematic role of the asylum as described. As a point of disciplinary 
intervention, enrollment in the asylum is dependent not upon differential diagnosis but upon an 
ultimate judgment of the presence of madness.  
“In organic medicine, the doctor vaguely formulates the following demand: Show me 
your symptoms and I will tell you what your illness is. In the psychiatric test, the psychiatrist's 
demand is much weightier, much more surcharged, and is: With what you are, with your life, 
with the grounds for people's complaints, with what you do, and what you say, provide me with 
some symptoms, not so that I know what your illness is, but so that I can stand before you as a 
doctor. That is to say, the psychiatric test is a double test for the official establishment of an 
individual's life as a tissue of pathological symptoms, as well as the constant official 
establishment of the psychiatrist as a doctor, or of the supreme disciplinary authority as a 
medical authority. Consequently, we can say that the psychiatric test is an endless test of 
admittance into the hospital. Why is it that one cannot leave the asylum? One cannot leave the 
asylum, not because the exit is far away, but because the entrance is too near. One never stops 
entering the asylum, and every encounter, every confrontation between the doctor and the patient 
begins again and indefinitely repeats this founding, initial act by which madness will exist as 
reality and the psychiatrist will exist as doctor” (268). 
 
 
Hysteria is, on Foucault’s view, a strategy devised by patients that allows them to escape 
the totality of the psychiatric interview. It allows them to demand the process of differential 
diagnosis, of medical legitimacy, by presenting the doctor with symptoms that must be analyzed 
with regard to a literal cause. The simulation of bodily symptoms is an antipsychiatric strategy in 
Foucault, a phenomenon that arises not from the desire to enter into the status of pathology, as 
Szasz explains it, but to lessen the consequences of such a status.  
 
The Anatomy of an Epidemic 
The two primary anti-psychiatry philosophies that we have examined thus far, those of 
Thomas Szasz and Michel Foucault, both center the bulk of their analyses around the historical 
concepts of delusion and hysteria. I would like to make an effort to extrapolate their criticisms to 
address the current psychiatric climate, which has evolved rapidly in the last half of the century. 
The first step in undertaking such an effort will be to give an account of this evolution. 
My primary source regarding the rise of the biomedical model of illness shall be ​The 
Anatomy of an Epidemic​, a text written by investigative journalist Robert Whitaker. The central 
line of questioning explored in the work considers, given the trends of increasing rates in the 
prescription of psychotropic medications and the increasing population of those disabled by 
mental illness, whether it’s possible that the biomedical paradigm of care is worsening the 
modern mental health epidemic. Whitaker’s methods of investigation include the meta-analysis 
of clinical studies and statistics, the recounting of historical events that lead to the prominence of 
particular treatments, and reflection upon various anecdotes provided by patients grappling with 
mental illness and medication.  
 
I would first like to place emphasis on the story of how psychotropic medications came to 
be heralded as the ultimate treatment for mental distress, which will help us to understand how 
the celebrated success of such treatments contributed to the widespread perception that mental 
illness is fundamentally biological in nature. Whitaker sets the stage by recounting the origin of 
the notion of the “magic bullet” in medicine, starting with the discovery of salvarsan, a 
compound capable of selectively killing the microbe responsible for syphilis. When researchers 
realized that they could test for substances with specific structures that allowed them to target the 
agents of disease without bringing harm to the rest of the body, the widespread search for magic 
bullets began, motivated by the possibility that any particular ailment may be susceptible to the 
same approach. Whitaker cites the exposition of terrible asylum conditions surrounding WWII as 
a catalyst that drove the search for medication that might serve as magic bullets in psychiatry, a 
search which became increasingly supported by federal funding as public concern for mental 
health continued to heighten (45).  
The development of the first major psychiatric drugs, however, occurs much differently 
from the discovery of the lock-and-key mechanism that allows “magic bullets” in traditional 
medicine to be so effective. Initially administered as part of the search for a medicine effective 
against malaria in 1949, the compound chlorpromazine was found to induce anaesthetic-like 
effects in patients without the loss of consciousness. Henri Laborit, the French surgeon who 
discovered the drug, went on to suggest that it might be useful in psychiatric settings, as its 
effects were comparable to a “medicinal lobotomy,” which remained a common form of 
treatment at that time (49). Not much later, another compound with muscle-relaxing side-effects 
is discovered by chemist Frank Berger in London, who quickly recognizes its commercial 
 
potential as a “minor tranquilizer” and aids in its development into the popular prescription 
medication Miltown. Finally, researchers at Hoffmann-La Roche observe that a compound found 
to yield effectiveness in treating tuberculosis, iproniazid, also conjured a sort of mania in 
patients. Though the administration of this drug appeared to result in some weighty side-effects, 
researchers contended that its extended use prompted a “complete remission in all symptoms” 
with regard to depressed patients (56). Reflecting on this trend, Whitaker reminds us that  
“none of these drugs had been developed after scientists had identified any disease 
process or brain abnormality that might have been causing [these] symptoms. They arrived out of 
the post-World War II search for magic bullets against infectious diseases, with researchers, 
during that process, stumbling upon compounds that affected the central nervous system in novel 
ways” (54). 
 
Whitaker goes on to explain how investigation into the mechanisms of iproniazid and 
imipramine, initially described as “psychic energizers” but gradually rebranded as 
“antidepressants,” came to inform the chemical imbalance theory of mental illness. As it was 
discovered that this family of medications had an inhibitory effect on an enzyme responsible for 
the reuptake of the neurotransmitters norepinephrine and serotonin, researchers hypothesized that 
those who suffer from affective disorders must have a deficiency of these neurotransmitters, 
which would account for the improvement in mood observed when the medication is 
administered. Though this account of mental illness remains popular amongst the general public, 
Whitaker cites multiple studies that, even shortly after its emergence, cast doubt upon the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis.  It would seem that, in general, patients tested before the 3
administration of any drug do not display neurochemical deviances as compared to baseline 
3For those interested, Whitaker also gives a detailed explanation of the mechanisms behind SSRIs on 
pages 79-84, pointing out that the transformation in neurotransmitter functionality that occurs cannot be 
described as correcting an imbalance, as it results in a configuration much different than what is seen in 
the “healthy” unmedicated brain. 
 
levels, and observations of alterations in neurological function and anatomy are mostly found in 
patients who have adhered to a drug regimen over an extended period of time (63-79). 
As psychotropic medications continue to garner legitimacy via the newly proposed 
biological mechanisms behind mental illness, the prognosis for such diseases begins to shift. 
Depression, for example, had a relatively positive long-term outcome in the first half of the 20th 
century, with episodes of melancholy manifesting scarcely and the majority ending in remission 
(153).  However, as treatment with antidepressants became increasingly common, so did relapse, 
particularly in cases in which a patient previously treated with antidepressants attempts to wean 
off their medication. The explanation provided for this phenomenon is that chronicity must be 
inherent to the disease; that depression is generally a life-long condition that requires consistent 
medication to manage. Whitaker wonders if perhaps this narrative is an inverse of the actual 
chain of events that follow from long-term use of antidepressants: the brain adapts to the altered 
baseline in neurotransmitter function, and when the agent responsible for this alteration is 
removed, the brain finds itself unable to re-adapt to the new state of affairs.  4
Finally, we can further observe the transformation of how mental illness is perceived in 
the anecdotal sections of Whitaker’s work, which follow the life events of various patients 
prescribed psychotropic medications, many of whom entered into psychiatric care at a young 
age. The majority of individuals Whitaker interacts with tell him that the most immediate 
explanation they were given was that they suffered from a chemical imbalance and would likely 
require medication for the rest of their lives (28).  Besides entering a regimen of medication upon 
the first episodes of mental distress, many of the individuals Whitaker interviews share another 
4 Whitaker is not the only one calling the effectiveness of antidepressants into question. Those interested 
should look to the work of psychologist Irving Kirsch, who has conducted research regarding 
antidepressants and the placebo effect.  
 
trait: trauma experienced in childhood, or other circumstances that give rise to significant stress. 
In none of these individual’s stories do their psychiatrists seem concerned with the etiology of 
their mental distress, only with finding the medication that will stabilize their symptoms the most 
quickly. 
 
The Bigger Picture 
Thinking back to the writings of Szasz and Foucault,​ ​I would like to argue that the former 
does not provide us with a coherent basis from which to criticize the recent bioessentialist 
direction taken by psychiatry, while the latter provides us with an underlying political analysis 
than can be easily brought to bear on the motivations behind the rise of medication as 
psychiatry’s primary paradigm of care. 
We may recall that one of Szasz’s most pertinent frustrations with psychiatry as it 
functioned in the age of hysteria was its reliance on the principle of determinism via personal 
history. It would seem that psychiatry has taken a drastic turn away from this psychoanalytic 
approach, as an opposite conception of mental illness can be seen in the anecdotes given by 
Whitaker. The prevalence of the chemical imbalance theory of mental disorder has resulted in a 
downplaying of environmental factors, past and present, that may have a role in the distress 
experienced by psychiatric patients. The explanatory strategy of psychiatry in regards to such 
distress has now come to overlap with the explanatory strategy that Szasz claims is rightly 
attributed to physiological medicine; that is, that the root of mental suffering can be traced back 
to a neurological basis that remains consistent across its manifestations.  
 
I also do not feel that Szasz’s own explanatory strategy regarding the experiences classed 
as mental illness includes enough nuance to account for the culture of microdiagnosis that has 
developed in recent years. The societal indoctrination of helplessness, which he believes are 
instilled by the structures of family and religion, is now greatly overshadowed by late 
capitalism’s demand for self-sufficiency and independence. Cultivating these virtues in one’s self 
is not only encouraged but required for survival. The notion that people suffering from 
debilitating depression and anxiety have chosen to simulate their symptoms as a cry for help 
seems less likely when we consider that such symptoms oftentimes result in financial and 
interpersonal poverty. 
It is at this juncture that I feel Foucault’s work provides more valuable resources for 
understanding the social role that psychiatry serves. His contention that psychiatry intervenes to 
reform those individuals that cannot successfully fulfill their roles as given to them by the 
overarching disciplinary system tracks with the trends we have seen with regards to increasingly 
psychotropic treatment regimens. He discusses the manifestation of hysteria as the original 
psychiatric patient’s escape from the binary of madness, an attempt to legitimize one’s suffering 
that I feel continues into today’s culture of self-diagnosis and illness as identity. This is not to 
say that I understand the embrace of clinical diagnosis as a method of simulation, but as a 
method of re-appropriating the disordered status given by psychiatric authority. Nonetheless, the 
internalization of the disciplinary system is a main theme in Foucault’s work, and it is my 
suspicion that the integration of clinical labels into one’s sense of self, while intended as a 
liberatory act, only serves to reify the systems of classification which deem particular feelings 
and behavior to be disordered. 
 
The implications my analysis of these philosophies has for psychiatry going forward are 
largely political. I believe that mental health professionals must acknowledge the role of social 
and economic matrices of discipline in order to gain a meaningful understanding of why and how 
mental suffering presents itself. To individualize the sources of symptomatic behavior, whether it 
be via recourse to the principle human autonomy, or the doctrines of neurochemistry and 
anatomy, is to obscure the massive influence of disciplinary power has on the way people 
experience and respond to their lives. 
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